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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-3152 
_____________ 
 
JAMES OSCAR WRIGHT, 
   Appellant 
                              
v. 
 
DEBRA K. SAUERS. Superintendent; MICHAEL OVERMYER Dep. Superintendent; 
ERIC TICE, Dep. Superintendent; ANTHONY GATTO, Correctional Officer; 
DANIEL CLEVER, Correctional Officer; NANCY MCGARVIE, Medical Director; 
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES INC, At SCI Forest; KIM SMITH, CHCA at SCI 
Forest; RAYMOND BURKHART; CORIZON HEALTH INC 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
Western District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 1:13-cv-00358) 
District Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter  
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 12, 2018 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENBERG, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 2, 2018) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION∗  
_____________ 
                                              
 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 James Oscar Wright, a former Pennsylvania state prisoner, appeals the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in his civil rights action for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “Act”).  For the 
following reasons, we affirm. 
I. 
Because the facts are well-known to the parties, we discuss only those facts 
necessary to our disposition.  In 2012, Wright was involved in an altercation with 
Corrections Officer Anthony Gatto while housed in a state correctional facility (the 
“Prison”).1  As a result of the incident, Wright’s right foot was severely broken. 
Thereafter, Wright sought redress through the grievance process outlined in 
Department of Corrections Policy DC-ADM 804.  DC-ADM 804 provides that, “[i]f the 
inmate desires compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court, the 
inmate shall request the specific relief sought in his/her initial grievance.”2  Here, while 
Wright’s initial grievance gave a detailed account of the underlying incident, it did not 
request monetary relief (or any relief for that matter). 
After the Prison investigated and rejected the grievance, Wright filed this action 
alleging, inter alia, that Gatto used excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment 
rights.  In 2017, Gatto—after having already once moved for summary judgment—again 
                                              
1 In his brief, Gatto’s last name is spelled “Gotto.”  However, because he is listed as “Gatto” 
in the caption and on the docket sheet, we will refer to him as “Gatto” in this opinion. 
2 JA 261 (emphasis added). 
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sought summary judgment on the basis that Wright failed to exhaust by not seeking 
monetary relief in his initial grievance.  The District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Gatto.  This appeal followed.3 
II. 
On appeal, Wright argues that we should reverse the District Court’s exhaustion 
determination and remand for a trial on the excessive force claim.  We disagree. 
The District Court’s finding of procedural default is supported by our Court’s 
decision in Spruill v. Gillis.4  In Spruill, we rejected a procedural default claim based on 
an inmate’s failure to specifically request monetary relief on a prior version of DC-ADM 
804.5  In so holding, we emphasized that the grievance policy in effect at that time 
permitted—but did not require—an inmate to identify the relief sought (including 
monetary relief) in his grievance.6  Crucially, however, we also observed that—to the 
extent it was dissatisfied with our ruling—the Prison could “alter the grievance system to 
require more (or less) of inmates by way of exhaustion.”7 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo the District Court’s determination 
that Wright failed to exhaust administrative remedies.  Robinson v. Superintendent 
Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 2016).  In so doing, we accept the District Court’s 
factual findings unless clearly erroneous.  Id. 
4 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004).   
5 Id. at 233–34. 
6 See id. at 233 (“Since an optional procedural provision cannot give rise to a procedural 
default, it appears that [plaintiff] is not now precluded from seeking money damages.”). 
7 Id. at 235. 
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Subsequently, the Prison amended its policy to include the mandatory language 
deemed lacking in Spruill.  Indeed, as noted, DC-ADM 804 now requires an inmate to 
specify whether he seeks “compensation or other legal relief normally available from a 
court” in his initial grievance.8  Since this requirement is now mandatory, the District Court 
rightly held that Wright procedurally defaulted his claim for money damages by failing to 
request such relief in his grievance.  
In response, Wright argues that the Act only requires exhaustion of the grievance 
process, not forms of relief.9  This argument fails.  The Supreme Court has held that the 
Act “requires proper exhaustion.”10  In this regard, “it is the prison’s requirements, [] not 
the [Act], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”11  Here, the Prison’s policy 
required Wright to specifically request monetary relief in his initial grievance.  Because 
Wright failed to do so, he defaulted his claim for money damages.12 
Finally, Wright maintains that, even if his grievance was defective, the Prison 
waived any argument regarding exhaustion by evaluating—and rejecting—his grievance 
on the merits.  This argument is unavailing.  Wright submitted a grievance that the Prison 
                                              
8 JA 261. 
9 See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001) (observing that “one ‘exhausts’ 
processes, not forms of relief”). 
10 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). 
11 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). 
12 To the extent that Wright claims the grievance process was “unavailable” because he 
was unaware of the severity of his injury when he filed his grievance, we disagree.  
Although Wright may not have known the extent of his injury, he knew he suffered an 
injury.  As such, this argument fails.  
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could, and did, decide on the merits.  Nevertheless, even though his grievance was not 
entirely deficient, he is still foreclosed from seeking monetary relief because he did not 
request it in his initial grievance.  Indeed, we contemplated this result in Spruill.13 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment. 
                                              
13 See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 233 (analyzing if an inmate procedurally defaulted on a claim 
for monetary relief where his grievance, which the Prison otherwise considered and 
rejected, failed to request such relief). 
